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The Agentic SOC: Security Operations at Machine Speed — Read the Brief

Agentic AI Security: 8 Key Risks, Controls & Best Practices

  • 12 minutes to read

Table of Contents

    What Is Agentic AI Security? 

    Agentic AI security is the practice of protecting autonomous AI agents that can plan, make decisions, and execute multi-step workflows using external tools and APIs. Unlike traditional AI systems that mainly generate text or predictions, agentic systems may call APIs, access files, query databases, run code, or interact with external applications. Security therefore needs to cover both the model and the actions the agent is allowed to perform.

    Key security risks and concerns of agentic AI:

    • Prompt injection and indirect prompt injection: Malicious instructions can manipulate agent behavior through user input or retrieved external content.
    • Goal hijacking and agent misalignment: Manipulated context or unexpected reasoning can cause agents to pursue unintended objectives.
    • Excessive tool and API permissions: Overprivileged agents can perform actions beyond what their assigned tasks require.
    • Unauthorized data access and exfiltration: Agents can be manipulated into retrieving sensitive information or sending it to unauthorized destinations.
    • Insecure MCP servers and tool integrations: Untrusted or compromised integrations can expose data, return deceptive content, or enable unsafe actions.
    • Agent identity and credential abuse: Shared, long-lived, or poorly protected credentials can provide attackers with access to connected systems.
    • Memory poisoning and context manipulation: Malicious information stored in agent memory can influence future decisions and actions.
    • Malicious or compromised third-party tools: Compromised plugins, APIs, and services can manipulate agents or expose sensitive data.

    Best practices for securing agents:

    • Establish behavioral baselines: Define expected tool use, data access, actions, and operating patterns for each agent.
    • Correlate agent activity with security telemetry: Connect agent actions with identity, endpoint, cloud, application, and network events.
    • Monitor for behavioral drift: Detect changes in tool usage, resource access, data volume, action frequency, and permission use over time.
    • Monitor human and non-human identities together: Track users, agents, service accounts, and workloads across complete workflows.
    • Integrate agent security into SOC workflows: Send agent events into existing SIEM, SOAR, identity, detection, and incident response processes.

    Why Agentic AI Requires a Different Security Approach

    Agents Can Take Autonomous Actions

    An AI agent may decide which action to take without waiting for explicit user instructions at every step. For example, it may modify a file, send a message, update a record, or execute code while completing a task.

    This autonomy increases the impact of incorrect reasoning, malicious instructions, or compromised context. Security controls should therefore limit which actions an agent can perform and require additional approval for high-risk operations.

    Agents Use Tools, APIs, and External Systems

    Agents often rely on tools to interact with systems outside the model. These may include APIs, databases, browsers, cloud services, internal applications, and command-line tools. Each integration expands the agent’s attack surface.

    Security must account for authentication, authorization, input validation, and data exposure across these connections. Agents should receive only the permissions they need, and tool access should be restricted based on the task and the sensitivity of the operation.

    Agents Operate Across Multi-Step Workflows

    Agentic tasks often involve a sequence of dependent actions. An agent may collect information, transform it, make a decision, and then use the result to trigger another operation. An error or malicious instruction introduced early in the workflow can therefore affect every later step.

    Controls need to evaluate the full workflow rather than individual prompts in isolation. This includes tracking state, validating intermediate outputs, monitoring tool calls, and preventing untrusted data from silently influencing sensitive actions.

    Key Agentic AI Cybersecurity Risks and Concerns 

    1. Prompt Injection and Indirect Prompt Injection

    Prompt injection occurs when malicious instructions cause an agent to ignore or override its intended rules. Direct prompt injection comes from user input, while indirect prompt injection can be hidden in content the agent retrieves, such as:

    • Web pages
    • Documents
    • Emails
    • Tool responses

    Indirect attacks are especially dangerous because an agent may treat external content as trusted context. Defenses include separating instructions from untrusted data, validating tool inputs, restricting sensitive actions, and preventing retrieved content from changing system-level behavior.

    2. Goal Hijacking and Agent Misalignment

    Goal hijacking happens when an attacker causes an agent to pursue a different objective from the one originally assigned. This may occur through:

    • Malicious prompts
    • Manipulated context
    • Poisoned memory
    • Deceptive tool output

    Even without an attacker, an agent can choose actions that technically satisfy a goal but violate security or business constraints. Systems should therefore define explicit boundaries around acceptable actions and validate important decisions before execution.

    3. Excessive Tool and API Permissions

    Agents may be given broad access to tools and APIs for convenience. If those permissions exceed what a task requires, a compromised or misdirected agent can perform actions with a much larger impact.

    Access should follow the principle of least privilege. Permissions can be scoped by tool, operation, resource, and time, with stronger controls for actions such as:

    • Deleting data
    • Changing configurations
    • Initiating transactions

    4. Unauthorized Data Access and Exfiltration

    Agents can access sensitive information through:

    • Connected databases
    • Files
    • SaaS applications
    • APIs

    Attackers may attempt to manipulate the agent into retrieving information they are not authorized to see or sending it to an external destination. Controls should enforce authorization at the data source rather than relying only on the model to follow instructions. Sensitive outputs should also be inspected for secrets, personal data, or other protected information before they leave trusted boundaries.

    5. Insecure MCP Servers and Tool Integrations

    Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers can expose tools and data sources to AI agents through a standardized interface. A poorly secured or malicious MCP server can:

    • Return deceptive content
    • Expose sensitive data
    • Provide tools that perform unsafe operations

    Organizations should treat MCP servers as part of the application supply chain. They should authenticate servers, restrict available tools, validate responses, monitor tool calls, and avoid connecting agents to untrusted MCP endpoints without isolation and review.

    6. Agent Identity and Credential Abuse

    Agents often need credentials to access APIs, databases, or cloud services. If credentials are shared, long-lived, or stored insecurely, an attacker who compromises the agent may gain access to the same systems.

    Each agent should have a distinct identity where possible, with narrowly scoped credentials and short-lived tokens. This makes it easier to:

    • Enforce permissions
    • Revoke access
    • Attribute actions during audits or incident investigations

    7. Memory Poisoning and Context Manipulation

    Agents may store information from previous interactions in short-term or persistent memory. If an attacker can insert false or malicious information into that memory, later decisions may be influenced even after the original interaction has ended.

    Memory should be treated as untrusted input unless its source and integrity are known. Systems can reduce risk by:

    • Validating stored information
    • Limiting what can persist
    • Tracking provenance
    • Preventing memory from overriding higher-priority instructions

    8. Malicious or Compromised Third-Party Tools

    Agents increasingly depend on external tools, plugins, APIs, and services. If one of these components is compromised, it can:

    • Provide manipulated results
    • Steal data
    • Cause the agent to perform unintended actions

    Third-party integrations should be reviewed for security, permissions, and data handling practices. Organizations should also monitor tool behavior, pin trusted versions where possible, and isolate high-risk integrations so that one compromised component cannot control the entire agent workflow.

    Key Agentic AI Security Controls 

    Least-Privilege Access for AI Agents

    Agents should receive only the permissions required for the current task. Broad access to files, APIs, databases, or cloud resources increases the impact of prompt injection, compromised context, and incorrect decisions.

    Permissions can be scoped by resource, action, environment, and duration. For example, an agent that only needs to read support tickets should not also be able to modify customer records or export an entire database.

    Temporary access is preferable for sensitive workflows because it reduces the value of stolen credentials and limits persistent access. Security teams should also review permissions regularly, since agent capabilities and connected tools may change over time.

    Agent and Workload Identity

    Each agent or agent workload should have a distinct machine identity rather than sharing a common service account. This allows systems to enforce access policies based on which agent is acting, which application it belongs to, and what task it is performing.

    Strong identity also improves auditing and incident response. Security teams can trace actions to an agent, revoke its access, and distinguish legitimate automation from unauthorized activity.

    Identity controls should work with existing identity and access management systems where possible. Short-lived workload identities, signed tokens, and policy-based authorization are generally safer than static credentials shared across multiple agents.

    Tool and MCP Access Controls

    Agents should not be able to call every available tool or MCP server by default. Tool access should be explicitly allowed based on the agent’s role, the current task, and the sensitivity of the operation.

    Controls can restrict selected functions, parameters, destinations, and data sources. An agent may be permitted to query a database, for example, while being blocked from deleting records or sending query results to an external service.

    MCP servers and tool endpoints should also be authenticated and reviewed before they are exposed to agents. Security teams should validate which tools a server provides, what permissions those tools require, and whether the returned content can influence future agent actions.

    Runtime Guardrails

    Runtime guardrails inspect and constrain agent behavior while the agent is operating. They can validate tool calls, block prohibited actions, enforce policy rules, and stop workflows when risk thresholds are exceeded.

    These controls should operate outside the model where possible. External enforcement prevents the agent from bypassing security rules simply because malicious context, prompt injection, or faulty reasoning changes its behavior.

    Runtime checks can also evaluate arguments before a tool executes. For example, a guardrail may allow an agent to send email internally but block messages containing sensitive data or prevent delivery to unapproved domains.

    Data Loss Prevention

    Data loss prevention controls reduce the risk of agents exposing sensitive information through responses, tool calls, logs, or external integrations. They can identify regulated data, credentials, source code, financial records, and other protected content.

    DLP policies should apply both when data enters the agent workflow and when information leaves it. Sensitive content can be blocked, masked, tokenized, or restricted to approved destinations.

    Agentic workflows also require attention to indirect data movement. An agent may retrieve sensitive information from one system and later include it in a tool request to another system, so DLP controls need visibility across the entire workflow rather than only the final response.

    Secrets and Credential Protection

    API keys, passwords, tokens, and certificates should not be embedded in prompts, agent memory, configuration files, or source code. Agents should retrieve secrets from managed secret stores only when required.

    Credentials should also be short-lived and narrowly scoped. Rotation, revocation, and detailed access logging reduce the impact if a secret is exposed through a compromised agent or tool. Where possible, the agent should not see the secret value itself. A trusted execution layer can inject credentials directly into an API call, reducing the chance that the model copies them into logs, outputs, or future context.

    Human-in-the-Loop Approval

    Sensitive actions should require explicit human approval before execution. Common examples include financial transactions, production changes, destructive operations, external communications, and access to highly sensitive data.

    Approval mechanisms should show the proposed action, affected resources, and relevant context. This gives reviewers enough information to detect unexpected or unsafe behavior before it causes impact. Approval should be risk-based rather than applied to every action. Low-risk and reversible tasks can remain automated, while high-impact, irreversible, or unusual actions can be escalated to a human reviewer.

    Behavioral Monitoring and Anomaly Detection

    Organizations should monitor agent actions, tool calls, permission use, data access, and workflow patterns. Baselines can help identify unusual behavior such as unexpected API calls, large data transfers, repeated authorization failures, or access outside normal task boundaries.

    Monitoring should capture enough context to reconstruct what happened. Useful records include the initiating user, agent identity, tools invoked, resources accessed, policy decisions, and the sequence of actions taken. Behavioral monitoring is most useful when combined with automated response. Suspicious activity can trigger alerts, revoke credentials, isolate the agent, or stop the workflow before additional damage occurs.

    Challenges of Implementing Agentic AI Security 

    Limited Observability into Agent Decision Paths

    Agent actions may be easy to log, but the reasoning that led to those actions is often less visible. An agent can combine information from prompts, memory, retrieved content, and tool outputs before deciding what to do next. This makes incident investigation and policy tuning more difficult. Security teams need detailed telemetry across the full workflow, including tool calls, inputs, outputs, policy decisions, and changes in agent state.

    How to address: Observability should focus on reconstructing actions and context rather than relying only on model-generated explanations. Structured logs and trace data are more useful for verifying what happened and identifying where controls failed.

    Dynamic and Unpredictable Agent Behavior

    Agents do not always follow the same execution path for the same type of task. Small changes in context, tool output, or user input can lead to different decisions and different sequences of actions. This variability makes static allowlists and fixed workflow assumptions less effective on their own. Testing is also more difficult because it is not enough to validate a single expected path. 

    How to address: Security controls need to evaluate behavior at runtime and apply policy based on the current action, resource, and risk level. Teams need to test edge cases, adversarial inputs, tool failures, ambiguous instructions, and unexpected interactions between multiple systems.

    Managing Non-Human Identities at Scale

    Large agent deployments can create thousands of non-human identities across applications, environments, and workflows. Without strong governance, these identities can accumulate excessive permissions, stale credentials, and unclear ownership. Each agent identity needs a defined purpose, owner, permission set, and lifecycle.  Organizations also need processes for provisioning, rotation, review, suspension, and deletion as agents are created or retired. At scale, manual management becomes impractical. 

    How to address: Identity governance, automated policy enforcement, and centralized inventory are needed to track which agents exist, what they can access, and whether their permissions still match their intended role.

    Agentic AI Security Best Practices 

    Organizations should consider the following ways to improve their agentic AI security.

    1. Establish Behavioral Baselines for AI Agents

    Organizations should define what normal behavior looks like for each agent. This can include the tools it typically uses, the systems it accesses, the volume of data it processes, the actions it performs, and the times or environments in which it operates. Baselines make it easier to identify unusual activity, such as a support agent suddenly querying financial systems or transferring significantly more data than usual. 

    They should be specific enough to detect meaningful changes without generating excessive false positives. Baselines should also account for legitimate variation. Agents may behave differently depending on task type, user role, environment, or workload, so monitoring should compare behavior against the appropriate operating context.

    Key actions:

    • Define expected tools, systems, actions, and data volumes for each agent.
    • Create baselines based on task type, user role, environment, and workload.
    • Monitor for activity that falls outside expected operating patterns.
    • Update baselines as agent capabilities and workflows change.

    2. Correlate Agent Activity with Identity and Security Telemetry

    Agent actions should be linked with identity, endpoint, cloud, application, and network telemetry. Looking at tool calls in isolation can make it difficult to determine whether an action was expected, authorized, or part of a larger attack sequence. For example, an unusual API call becomes more significant if it occurs shortly after a credential change, suspicious login, or privilege escalation. 

    Correlation helps security teams understand the full chain of events rather than investigating each signal separately. Logs should include the initiating user, agent identity, workload identity, requested action, accessed resource, and relevant policy decisions. This context improves both detection and incident investigation.

    Key actions:

    • Correlate agent events with identity, endpoint, cloud, application, and network telemetry.
    • Record the initiating user, agent identity, and workload identity.
    • Track requested actions, accessed resources, and relevant policy decisions.
    • Investigate related signals as part of the same activity chain.

    3. Monitor for Behavioral Drift Over Time

    Agent behavior can change as prompts, models, tools, data sources, and workflows are updated. These changes may be intentional, but they can also introduce new security risks or gradually move the agent outside its original operating boundaries. Teams should monitor for changes in tool usage, resource access, action frequency, data volume, and permission use. 

    Significant deviations from established patterns should trigger investigation or a review of the agent’s configuration. Behavioral drift should also be evaluated after major updates. A new model or tool integration may alter how an agent approaches tasks even when its stated purpose remains unchanged.

    Key actions:

    • Track changes in tool usage, resource access, action frequency, data volume, and permissions.
    • Compare current activity with established behavioral patterns.
    • Investigate significant deviations from expected behavior.
    • Reevaluate baselines after changes to models, prompts, tools, data sources, or workflows.

    4. Monitor Human and Non-Human Identities Together

    Agent identities should not be monitored separately from human users, service accounts, and workloads. Many agentic workflows involve multiple identities interacting with the same applications and data. Monitoring them together helps reveal attack paths that cross identity types. For example, a compromised user account may invoke an agent, which then uses a service identity to access another system.

    Unified identity monitoring also improves attribution. Security teams can determine who initiated a workflow, which agent acted on the request, which credentials were used, and which resources were affected.

    Key actions:

    • Monitor users, agents, service accounts, and workloads within the same workflows.
    • Track which user initiated each workflow and which agent performed subsequent actions.
    • Record the credentials and identities used to access connected systems.
    • Correlate activity across identity types to identify complete attack paths.

    5. Integrate Agent Security into Existing SOC Workflows

    Agent-related alerts should flow into the same security operations processes used for other threats. Creating a separate monitoring environment for AI agents can fragment investigations and make it harder to correlate activity across systems. SOC teams should enrich existing detections with agent-specific context, such as tool calls, prompts associated with actions, workload identities, and policy decisions. 

    Incident response playbooks should also cover actions such as disabling an agent, revoking its credentials, or blocking a tool integration. Where possible, agent events should be sent to existing SIEM, SOAR, identity, and detection platforms. This allows organizations to extend current workflows rather than building an entirely separate security stack.

    Key actions:

    • Send agent security events to existing SIEM, SOAR, identity, and detection platforms.
    • Enrich alerts with tool calls, workload identities, prompts associated with actions, and policy decisions.
    • Include agent activity in existing investigation and incident response processes.
    • Create response actions for disabling agents, revoking credentials, and blocking tool integrations.

    Securing AI Agents with Exabeam Agent Behavior Analytics

    Exabeam Agent Behavior Analytics (ABA) gives security teams visibility into AI agent activity across the digital workforce. It extends behavioral analytics to AI agents and autonomous workflows, monitoring major AI platforms and open-source telemetry sources to identify risk, investigate threats, and improve readiness. To support the broader security community, Exabeam contributes to open-source tools like Praxen, the reference implementation for Agent Behavior Verification (ABV) used to verify agent permissions and boundaries before deployment, and Observra, an open-source telemetry library that standardizes runtime agent activity. ABA can be added to an existing SIEM with New-Scale Analytics or deployed as part of New-Scale Fusion for integrated detection, investigation, and response across human and non-human identities.

    Key capabilities of Exabeam Agent Behavior Analytics:

    • Behavioral detections for AI agents: Establishes behavioral baselines for AI agents and autonomous workflows, then detects misuse, drift, abnormal tool usage, risky access, and actions outside an agent’s intended role, including autonomous installation and execution.
    • Tool usage and MCP activity tracking: Monitors how agents invoke tools and interact with MCP servers, helping teams identify activity that falls outside expected roles.
    • Broad agent coverage: Analyzes activity from Claude Enterprise, ChatGPT, Google Gemini, Microsoft Copilot, GitHub Copilot, and custom agents. Observra standardizes agent telemetry, while Exabeam Agent Sensor collects and normalizes activity across models, agents, and runtime environments.
    • AI security posture management: Outcomes Navigator maps ABA coverage to the OWASP Agentic Top 10, identifies gaps in data and detections, and uses the Exabeam Nova Advisor Agent to recommend data sources and detections that improve readiness.
    • Automated investigation of agent activity: Machine-built timelines correlate agent actions with related user, entity, and application activity, while Exabeam Nova summarizes threats, explains behavioral context, and recommends next steps with analysts remaining in control.
    • Customizable detection rules: ABA detections are available in Threat Detection Management, where teams can review, clone, tune, and customize them. Exabeam Nova Rule Creator generates behavioral models and correlation rules from natural language and converts Sigma and YARA rules into Exabeam detections.
    • Open-source verification with Praxen: Serves as the reference implementation for Agent Behavior Verification (ABV). It compares a declared behavioral policy or worker remit with actual implementation evidence to identify gaps, excessive permissions, and capability drift before agents enter production.
    • Standardized runtime telemetry with Observra: Provides a clean open-source telemetry library. It captures, normalizes, and enriches agent activity across major frameworks with cost, risk, and redaction signals to feed directly into security monitoring.

    Learn more about Exabeam Agent Behavior Analytics

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